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Logic is the arsenal, and rhetoric the artillery, which it preserves.  
Both have their utility; both contribute to the same purposes.  But the 
arts themselves are as distinct, as those of the architect, who erects the 
building, and of the armorer, who fabricates the weapons.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Opposing counsel has just made “that” argument.  It sounds so 
good.  It is enough to accelerate your pulse and cause you to perspire.  
The argument flows from the lips, with the meter of the syllogism, from 
premise to premise to conclusion.  It sounds patently simple, intuitively 
 
∗ Stephen M. Rice is an Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. 
† A special note of thanks is given to Dr. Edward N. Martin and Professor Joel D. Hesch.  Their 
wise insights into drafts of this article have been very helpful. Any errors herein are mine, not theirs. 
 1. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LECTURES ON RHETORIC AND ORATORY 40 (Cambridge, Hilliard 
and Metcalf 1810). 
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logical, but, at the same time, ineffably wrong.  Something about 
opposing counsel’s argument is unsettling, but it is difficult to capture or 
explain precisely what is wrong with it.  Something about the argument 
offends your innate argumentative sensibilities.  It looks, it walks, and it 
sounds like a duck, but something inside you is certain it is a pig.  You 
just cannot explain what is wrong with the argument.  If only you could 
put your finger on what is wrong.  Better yet, if only you could give 
whatever is wrong a name. 
If you could name the problem with opposing counsel’s argument, 
you could explain it away.  Once you had a name for the argument’s 
defect, it would at least stop quacking.  It might even start to “oink.”  A 
name, along with a credible explanation of why it cannot possibly be a 
duck, would waft this argument’s true odor toward the court, just enough 
to get the panel to shift in their seats away from the smell, lean toward 
you, and listen to your explanation.  Then you could explain what would 
soon be obvious: that what seemed to be a webbed footed, yellow 
beaked, quacking argument was no duck at all.  In fact, it was a pig; no, 
not a pig, but a hog; and hogs, well, hogs get slaughtered.2   
Such is the nature of logical argument.  It might be a litigator’s 
most difficult intellectual problem.  Like the distinction between a duck 
and a hog, the distinction between what is logical and what is illogical is 
certain.  Yet, when dressed up in the webbed feet and feathers of the 
language of advocacy, even a distinct logical skeleton can be difficult to 
recognize, much less categorize or explain.  In fact, it has been said, 
“Truth may have its norms, but error is infinite in its aberrations.”3  For 
example, in a trial brief the distinction between the logical and illogical 
is clouded by paragraphs of case analysis, factual characterizations, and 
legal theory.  Similarly, in an oral argument logical and illogical 
arguments can hide, almost indistinguishably, in thickets of dialog, 
rhetoric, credibility determinations, legal inferences, presumptions, and 
emotional pleas to fairness.  Yet, “[t]ruth has a chance when Noise and 
Distraction are on her side; otherwise she may be overcome.”4  These 
“distractions” from the mission of determining the logical soundness of 
legal arguments can transform the otherwise simple task of 
distinguishing a duck from a pig into a difficult one.  This difficulty 
 
 2. Pigs get fat.  Hogs get slaughtered.  “There is a principle of too much; phrased 
colloquially, when a pig becomes a hog it is slaughtered.”  In re Zouhar, 10 B.R. 154, 157 (Bankr. 
D. N.M. Mar. 24, 1981) (quoting Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir. 1979)). 
 3. H. W. B. JOSEPH, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 569 (2d ed. 1916). 
 4. W. WARD FEARNSIDE & WILLIAM B. HOLTHER, FALLACY:THE COUNTERFEIT OF 
ARGUMENT 1 (1959). 
2
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turns into impossibility for the lawyer who is not comfortable with the 
logical tools necessary to discern, name, and scrutinize the logical 
structure of their opponent’s argument.  
The problem and solution are logical.  When John Quincy Adams 
wrote, “Logic is the arsenal, and rhetoric the artillery, which it preserves.  
Both have their utility; both contribute to the same purposes.  But the 
arts themselves are as distinct, as those of the architect, who erects the 
building, and of the armorer, who fabricates the weapons,”5 he was 
identifying an important distinction between two of the important tools 
of a good litigator: logic and rhetoric.  However, litigators frequently 
rely too much on their rhetorical skills as advocates without giving the 
same attention to their reasoning skills as logicians.  When making an 
argument based on invalid logic, even the most talented, persuasive, and 
sincere advocate should fail.6  However, ensuring the failure of an 
illogical legal argument requires an opponent to have at least a 
rudimentary understanding of the theory and practice of philosophical 
logic. 
Since Aristotle, the world’s greatest philosophical minds have 
examined the theory of logic.  That history includes a study of what 
logicians refer to as logical fallacies.7  The concept of logical fallacy has 
survived the century and has been examined and refined by 
contemporary logicians.8  Fortunately for lawyers, philosophers, by 
developing the theory of the logical fallacy, have done the philosophical 
heavy lifting: identifying patterns of reasoning that are inherently 
illogical, explaining why the structure is necessarily illogical and 
destined to fail, and even giving these patterns names.  These patterns 
are ready-made, “off the shelf” solutions for those lawyers who are 
willing to understand what they are and how to use them.  A logically 
fallacious argument is an argument that “seems to be [logically] valid 
 
 5. ADAMS, supra note 1. 
 6. “The failure to ground legal education in principles of logic does violence to the essence 
of the law.”  Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Logic for Law Students: How to Think like a Lawyer, 69 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007). 
 7. “Aristotle addresses the fallacies in De Sophisticis Elenchis, Prior Analytics, and 
Rhetoric.  In De Spohisticis Elenchis he treats the subject most thoroughly; the Prior Analytics 
contains some additional remarks; and in Rhetoric only a selection is discussed from the list 
compiled in De Sophisticis Elenchis.  The title De Sophisticis Elenchis means ‘On Sophistical 
Refutations’ or ‘On refutations as used by the Sophists.’  This is why fallacies are sometimes called 
sophisms.”  FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY 57 
(1996). 
 8. See C. L. HAMBLIN, FALLACIES 9-13 (1970) (describing a historical account of the logical 
fallacy, its origins, and its contemporary usage). 
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but is not so.”9  Just as important as the philosophical acceptance of 
logical fallacies is the jurisprudential acceptance of logical fallacies.  
Courts have recognized logical fallacies, like the formal fallacies of 
Affirming the Consequent,10 Denying the Antecedent,11 the Fallacy of 
the Undistributed Middle,12 and others, as bases for evaluating legal 
arguments.  Judicial reliance on logical fallacies provides practical 
examples that effectively use these philosophical principles in legal 
arguments.  Additionally, courts’ reliance on logical fallacies provides 
legal authority for arguments seeking to expose and explain the 
invalidity of a legal argument on grounds of philosophical logic.   
This article explores the logical fallacy named the Fallacy of the 
Undistributed Middle and demonstrates how it can be a powerful tool for 
those engaged in the discipline of solving legal problems and evaluating 
legal arguments.  First, it will explain what formal logic is, how it is 
different from informal conventions of logic, and describe the important 
role formal logic plays in skillful advocacy.13  Second, it will explain the 
Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle and why arguments falling into this 
fallacious pattern of reasoning are logically invalid.14  Third, it will 
examine the courts’ contemporary recognition of this formal logical 
fallacy as a basis for rejecting legal arguments.15  Last, it will explain 
how to identify the Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle in legal 
 
 9. Hans Vilhelm Hansen, The Straw Thing of Fallacy Theory: The Standard Definition of 
‘Fallacy’, 16 ARGUMENTATION 133, 133 (2002) (quoting C. L. HAMBLIN, FALLACIES 12 (1970)).  
Hansen considers this and a variety of other definitions of “fallacy.”  Id. at 133-55.  See also infra 
note 29 and accompanying text. 
 10. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Nev. Power Co., 488 F.3d 1189, 1197 n.7 (9th Cir. 2007); City of 
Green Ridge v. Kreisel, 25 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 
572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Culton v. State, 95 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App. 2002). 
 11. See, e.g., TorPharm Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003); 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. MFS Commc’ns Co., 901 F.Supp. 835, 849 (D. Del. 1995); Villines v. Harris, 11 
S.W.3d 516, 520 n.2 (Ark. 2000); Health Pers. v. Peterson, 629 N.W.2d 132, 135 n.3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001); Iams v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 883 N.E.2d 466, 478-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); 
Edwards v. Riverdale Sch. Dist., 188 P.3d 317, 321 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Hale v. Water Res. Dep't, 
55 P.3d 497, 502 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2003); In re Luna, 175 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
 12. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134 (1948);  Spencer 
v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 578 (1967);  Allied Erecting & Dismantling, Co. v. USX Corp., 249 F.3d 
191, 202 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2001);  Lucas Aerospace, LTD. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 899 F.Supp. 1268, 
1287 (D. Del. 1995); Nickolas F. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr.3d 208, 222 n.17 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006); Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, LP v. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 789 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 
n.10 (Ind. Tax. Ct. 2003); Atl. Aluminum & Metal Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 47 C.C.P.A. 88, 
90 (C.C.P.A. 1960).  See also Part IV-V. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
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arguments and how to unmask and disarm these logically invalid 
arguments from a litigator’s perspective.16 
II. PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC, LOGICAL FALLACY, AND WHAT LAWYERS 
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THEM 
Lawyers consider legal reasoning to be a tool of their trade.  
Lawyers are so inundated with concepts like “legal reasoning,” “thinking 
like a lawyer,” and “case analysis” that they rarely give much careful 
thought to understanding these concepts.  For example, a lawyer might 
read a judicial opinion and think to himself, “this was well-reasoned” (or 
not), confident that he intuitively understands that the opinion he just 
read is, in some sense, “logical” (or not).  Lawyers devote little time to 
exhaustive analysis and synthesis of the arguments underpinning the 
court’s opinion.  They do not analyze the opinion’s precise logical 
structure.  They do not objectively confirm whether the opinion is truly 
well-reasoned.  Furthermore, they have little time to devote to an 
exhaustive understanding of the philosophy of logic and a full 
appreciation of the strengths or weaknesses of the formal systems of 
logic that philosophy has developed over the years, much less to 
consider how to apply these philosophical theories to a court’s opinion. 
Why do lawyers ignore the important philosophical basis for logical 
thinking?  First, most lawyers emerge from the legal education process 
convinced that they would not have graduated without knowing how to 
“think like a lawyer.”  They are probably right about that.  
Unfortunately, the need to be both accurate and efficient in our legal 
analytical abilities requires that most lawyers reduce the process of legal 
analysis to, at the most, an abbreviated, intuitive sense of reason and, at 
the least, a “gut feeling.”  Most clients will not tolerate a 3.25-hour 
charge on their bill for an entry titled: “Considered philosophy of logic 
in the course of reviewing Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.”  
Understanding and explaining logic from the ground up takes time.   
Second, even if a lawyer takes time to figure out if an argument is 
truly logical, it takes even more time to explain to the judge, opposing 
counsel, jury, colleague, or client exactly why an argument has logical 
failings, particularly when, on its face, the argument sounds sensible.  
Instead of obsessing with the logical particulars of an argument, a lawyer 
relies on his logical intuition, honed by three years of studying the case 
method.  If an argument or decision is well reasoned, it just sits well 
 
 16. See infra Part V. 
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with him.  There is something logically satisfying about it.  If it is not 
well reasoned, a lawyer typically knows something is “wrong” with the 
argument.  It is logically unsettling.  It does not pass “the smell test.”  
However, it may not be so obvious just why it is so unsettling.  
Furthermore, where another disagrees with his logical intuition, he may 
lack the tools that will help conclusively explain why his argument is 
right and his opponent’s argument is wrong. 
This leads to the second reason why lawyers regularly overlook the 
process or importance of deconstructing and scrutinizing the logical 
form of legal argument.  Lawyers are not particularly well armed to do 
this.  They know how to use the case method, argue by analogy, and 
even detect many informal fallacies17 in reasoning, like “straw man”18 or 
“ad hominem”19 arguments.  They know very well how to define legal 
terms.  They know how to use cases and other authorities to limit or 
expand those legal definitions.  They know how to use evidence to 
decorate a legal framework with factual support.  However, when it 
comes to discussing the naked skeleton of reason, unadorned by 
analogous decisions in similar cases or evidentiary credibility and legal 
presumptions, most lawyers have no framework or language to identify 
or communicate what is right or wrong with the bare logical framework 
 
 17. “An informal fallacy is an error in argument due to faulty assumptions or to irrelevances 
occurring in stating the evidence for a conclusion.”  WILLIAM J. KILGORE, AN INTRODUCTORY 
LOGIC 11 (2d ed. 1979).  Other authors have stated the distinction between formal and informal 
fallacies this way: “Formal fallacies are violations of logic . . . . Whether an argument is valid or 
invalid concerns merely the logic of the argument, and not the truth of the premises and conclusion, 
that is, soundness of the argument.  If an argument is invalid, a fallacy has been committed.  This 
type of fallacy, then, is what we mean by ‘formal fallacies.’ . . .  [I]nformal fallacies . . . should act 
as warning signs.  They give us reason to challenge the argument.  Although they will often provide 
sufficient reason to reject the argument, further reflection may deem the argument worth accepting. . 
. . [T]he detection of [informal] fallacies is neither sufficient nor necessary to show that we should 
reject the argument.  They tell us to investigate further, or to pass the burden of proof back to the 
arguer.”  MALCOLM MURRAY & NEBOJSA KUJUNDZIC, CRITICAL REFLECTION:  A TEXTBOOK FOR 
CRITICAL THINKING 397 (2005) (alteration in original). 
 18. “The Straw Man fallacy involves the attribution or assumption of a position, which is then 
attacked or dismissed.  The problem is that the position dismissed by the argument is not the real 
‘man’ or ‘person’, but a caricature of the real position held.  In a dialogue, a position may be 
explicitly attributed to an opponent.  But for whatever reason, either that position is not one that the 
opponent actually holds, or the opponent does not hold the position in quite the way that has been 
attributed.  Hence, an argument that attacks and dismisses the attributed position diverts attention 
from the real position and is therefore fallacious.” CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE, FALLACIES AND 
ARGUMENT APPRAISAL 20 ( 2007). 
 19. “This fallacy shifts an argument from the point being discussed (ad rem) to irrelevant 
personal characteristics of an opponent (ad hominen).”  RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR 
LAWYERS:  A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 182 (3rd ed. 1997). 
6
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itself.  When it comes right down to it, most lawyers cannot adequately 
explain what formal logic is and why it is so reliable. 
An understanding of the basic form of deductive logical argument 
arms the lawyer with important tools necessary to evaluate the logical 
structure of legal argument, identify it as logically valid or invalid, and 
explain why this is so.  In more practical terms, lawyers who understand 
formal logic have the power to topple a legal argument built without a 
logical foundation.  Logic provides a definite, reliable, and objective 
basis for analyzing legal and other arguments.  Logic distinguishes 
arguments that have a logically valid form from those that have a 
logically invalid form.  Those formally invalid arguments are called 
fallacies.20  Fallacious arguments fall into one or more of several 
patterns.  Each of these logically fallacious patterns has been defined and 
given a distinct name descriptive of what is wrong with the argument.  
These named fallacious patterns provide a lawyer with the ability to 
efficiently analyze, identify, and communicate fallacious legal 
reasoning.     
So what is formal logic?  For purposes of legal reasoning, it is 
sufficient for lawyers to understand that “formal logic” refers to the 
consideration of the form of a logical argument.  It has been said, “Logic 
is the study of right reason or valid inferences and the attending 
fallacies, formal and informal.”21  The specific logical fallacy considered 
in this article is a fallacy of deductive logic.  Deductive logic is the 
“logic of necessary inference.”22  It requires that the conclusion 
 
 20. See infra, note 30. 
 21. NORMAN L. GEISLER & RONALD M. BROOKS, COME, LET US REASON 12 (3rd prtg. 1994).  
Philosophers have defined and debated what logic is or what makes a study of logic “formal.”  
“Logic, in the most extensive sense in which it has been thought advisable to employ the name, may 
be considered as the Science, and also as the Art, of Reasoning.”  L.W. LEDYARD, ELEMENTS OF 
LOGIC 1 (New York, Harper & Bros. Publishers 1858).  “Formal Logic is a propaedeutic which is 
abstractly concerned with consistency of reasoning without any reference to the truth or the 
falsehood of the accepted premises, or to the knowledge or the ignorance of the reasoner.”  W. R. 
BOYCE GIBSON, THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC 157 (1908).  “Pure or Formal Logic is the science of the 
necessary laws of thought.  It has thought rather than language for its adequate object-matter; for 
though it must express itself in language, and is very much concerned with it, language comes in 
only as the minister of thought.  It is a science; -- a science rather than an art.”  J. LACY O’BYRNE 
CROKE, LOGIC 3 (1906) (emphasis in original).  “[F]ormal logic is devoted to thought in general and 
those universal forms and principles of thought which hold good everywhere, both in judging of 
reality and in weighing possibility, irrespective of any difference in the objects.”  HERMANN LOTZE, 
LOGIC IN THREE  BOOKS OF THOUGHT, OF INVESTIGATION, AND OF KNOWLEDGE 10-11 (Bernard 
Bosanquet ed., 2d ed, Oxford, The Clarendon Press 1888). 
 22. PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 31 (Wadsworth Publishing 
2006).  (“A deductive argument is an argument in which the arguer claims that it is impossible for 
the conclusion to be false given that the premises is true.”).  See also KILGORE, supra note 13, at 
7
Rice: Indispensable Logic
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
RICE 1.11.10.DOC 1/14/2010  12:18 PM 
86 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:79 
necessarily follow from the two premises.  In deductive logic, an 
argument is formed that claims its conclusion is necessarily supported by 
its premises.23  That is, in deductive logic, if the premises are true, and 
the form of the argument is valid, then it is logically impossible for the 
conclusion to be false.24  An example of a deductive argument is:  
If a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, then it 
satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6).   
Plaintiff’s complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.   
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule 
of Procedure 12(b)(6). 
Deductive reasoning requires analyzing arguments in syllogisms.  
A syllogism is an argumentative structure made up of two distinct but 
related premises and a conclusion of the deductive argument.25  There 
are different types of syllogisms.26  One common syllogism used in legal 
argumentation is a categorical syllogism where the conclusion follows 
from the relationship between the concepts in the premises and their 
membership in certain categories.27  For example, when a legal issue 
revolves around whether a certain act meets a statutory definition, it may 
very well fit into a categorical syllogism.  Similarly, when a legal issue 
focuses on whether a party met the requirements of a term of a contract, 
 
509 (“[Deductive logic] is the analysis of arguments whose form requires that in all cases in which 
the conclusion is false at least one premise is also false.”). 
 23. IRVIN M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 26 (13th ed. 2009).  Deductive 
logic is different from inductive logic.  Inductive logic involves an argument that claims its 
conclusion is supported by its premises, but not necessarily required by them.  Accordingly, a valid 
deductive argument has the potential to be a more persuasive device for argumentation. 
 24. DOUGLAS WALTON, INFORMAL LOGIC: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 138 (2d ed. 2008). 
 25. ALEXANDER BAIN, LOGIC 134 (London, Longmans, Green Reader, & Dyer 1870); 
CHRISTOPH SIGWART, LOGIC 374 (Helen Dendy trans., London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1895); 
AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN, FORMAL LOGIC 88 (A. E. Taylor, ed., The Open Court Co. 1926).   
 26. There are three principal kinds of syllogisms: the categorical syllogism, the disjunctive 
syllogism, and the hypothetical syllogism.  COPI & COHEN, supra note 23, at 301.  The disjunctive 
syllogism “contains a compound, disjunctive (or alternative) premise asserting the truth of at least 
one of two alternatives, and a premise that asserts the falsity of one of those alternatives.”  Id.  The 
hypothetical syllogism contains “one or more compound, hypothetical (or conditional) propositions, 
affirming that if one of its components (the antecedent) is true then the other of its components (the 
consequent) is true.”  Id. 
 27. “A categorical syllogism is defined as an argument consisting of three categorical 
propositions which contain between them three and only three terms.  Two of the propositions are 
premises, the third is the conclusion.”  MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LOGIC 77 (John Corcoran ed., 2d ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.  1993) (1962).  “Categorical propositions 
are regarded as being about classes, the classes of objects designated by the subject and predicate 
terms.”  COPI & COHEN, supra note 23, at 189. 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/3
RICE 1.11.10.DOC 1/14/2010  12:18 PM 
2010] INDISPENSABLE LOGIC 87 
that issue may fit neatly into a categorical syllogism.  Take, for example, 
the following argument: 
Prosecutor: “Your honor, the Virginia statute28 prohibits the possession 
of a ‘blackjack, brass or metal knucks . . . switchblade knife, ballistic 
knife, or like weapons.’  The Defendant was found in possession of a 
homemade throwing knife, which is plainly “ballistic” in character.  
Accordingly, the Defendant is in violation of the statute. 
The argument appears to be valid.  Breaking the argument into its 
components and arranging them in the form of a syllogism allows us to 
give more careful consideration to the terms of the argument and their 
relationship to the conclusion.  One could state this argument 
syllogistically as: 
All persons possessing ballistic knifes are in violation of the statute. 
Defendant is a person in possession of a ballistic knife. 
Therefore, Defendant is in violation of the statute. 
The import of this syllogism, like all categorical syllogisms, rests 
on the relationship between the first two sentences.  These sentences are 
called categorical propositions because they are propositions that 
categorize the terms of the syllogism.  The categories here are “persons 
possessing ballistic knives” and “persons in violation of the statute.”  
One can understand the form of the deductive logic of an argument by 
studying its syllogistic skeleton.  Furthermore, we can test the integrity 
of this logical skeleton by using recognized rules of logic and thereby 
determine whether the argument is logically fallacious. 
Logicians have cataloged the various forms of syllogisms and 
developed a set of six29 rules for syllogisms of deductive logic.30  
 
 28. Section 18.2-311 of the Code of Virginia states: “If any person sells or barters, or exhibits 
for sale or for barter, or gives or furnishes, or causes to be sold, bartered, given or furnished, or has 
in his possession, or under his control, with the intent of selling, bartering, giving or furnishing, any 
blackjack, brass or metal knucks, any disc of whatever configuration having at least two points or 
pointed blades which is designed to be thrown or propelled and which may be known as a throwing 
star or oriental dart, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, or like weapons, such person shall be guilty 
of a Class 4 misdemeanor.  The having in one’s possession of any such weapon shall be prima facie 
evidence, except in the case of a conservator of the peace, of his intent to sell, barter, give or furnish 
the same.” VA CODE ANN. § 18.3-311 (2009).  
 29. Not all logicians have agreed on the number of rules or their numeration.  See e.g., 
HURLEY, supra note 22, at 256.  (articulating five rules but noting “logicians of today generally 
settle on five or six” [rules of syllogism.]  Hurley explains the distinction between five and six rules 
by stating, “Some texts include a rule stating that the three terms of a categorical syllogism must be 
used in the same sense throughout the argument.” Id.  Hurley and others incorporate this rule into 
the definition of “categorical syllogism.”   
9
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Concluding that a deductive argument is well formed and has a valid 
logical structure requires strict adherence to all of these rules.  Where an 
argument’s form violates even one of these rules, the argument is 
fallacious.31  However, most definitions agree that fallacies of deductive 
 
 30. The six syllogistic rules have been typically stated as: (1) Avoid four terms (i.e., a 
categorical syllogism must contain three terms, and the terms must have the same meaning each 
time they are used in the argument.); (2) Distribute the middle term in at least one premise (a 
discussion of the logical term “distribute” follows); (3) Any term distributed in the conclusion must 
be distributed in the premises; (4) Avoid two negative premises; (5) If either premise is negative the 
conclusion must be negative; (6) From two universal premises no particular conclusion may be 
drawn.  See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 23, at 244-49 (2008).  However, compare Charles L. 
Hamblin’s discussion regarding historical variations on the rules of validity of syllogisms and his 
proposal that three concise rules could adequately encompass the requirements.  HAMBLIN, supra 
note 8, at 196-202 .   
 31. Others have described and debated the meaning of the term fallaciousness more 
comprehensively as a philosophical subject.  For a thorough discussion of the historical meaning of 
fallacy throughout the history of the philosophy of logic, see H. V. Hansen, The Straw Thing of 
Fallacy Theory: The Standard Definition of ‘Fallacy’, 16 ARGUMENTATION 133 (2002).  Hansen 
considers a variety of definitions of fallacy: “A fallacious argument, as almost every account from 
Aristotle onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so.”  Id. at 133 (quoting 
HAMBLIN, supra note 8, at 12).  It has been customary for books on logic to contain a separate 
section or chapter on fallacies, defined as errors in reasoning.”  Id. at 137 (citing MORRIS R. 
COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 376 (Harcourt, 
Brace and Co. 1934)). 
The term “fallacy” is often used to refer to any kind of mistaken belief, however arrived 
at.  In this sense it may be said, for instance, that the belief that women are illogical is a 
“fallacy.”  For our present purpose, this sense is too wide, and we shall consider only 
errors in reasoning. . . . We . . . adopt the following definition: A fallacy is an argument 
that seems to be sound without being so in fact.  An argument is “sound” for the purpose 
of this definition if the conclusion is reached by a reliable method and the premises are 
known to be true.  This definition agrees well with one common meaning of “fallacy.” 
Id. at 138 (quoting MAX BLACK, CRITICAL THINKING 229-230 (1952)). 
Sophistical reasoning appears to be genuine reasoning but actually is fallacious.  
Sophistics, therefore, is that part of logic concerned with the defective syllogism.  A 
sophistic argument is a syllogism that seems to infer a conclusion from probable 
premises but, because of one fallacy or another, does not really do so.  The defect in the 
argument occurs either on the part of matter alone or on the part of both matter and form. 
  Id. at 138 (quoting JOHN A. OESTERLE, LOGIC: THE ART OF DEFINING AND REASONING 253 (2d 
ed. 1963).  “‘Strictly speaking, the term ‘fallacy’ designates an unacceptable mode of reasoning.  
However, the term is usually extended to include types of improper definition.’”  Id. at 139 (quoting 
EDITH WATSON SCHIPPER & EDWARD SCHUH, A FIRST COURSE IN MODERN LOGIC 24 (1959)). 
The word “fallacy” is used in various ways.  One perfectly proper use of the word is to 
designate any mistaken idea or false belief, like the “fallacy” of believing that all men 
are honest.  But logicians use the term in the narrower sense of an error in reasoning or 
in argument.  A fallacy, as we shall use the term, is a type of incorrect argument. 
Id. at 139 (quoting IRVING M. COPI,  INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 52 (2d ed. 1961)). 
The word “fallacy” is sometimes used as a synonym for any kind of position that is false 
or deceptive, and sometimes it is applied in a more narrow sense to a faulty process of 
reasoning or to tricky or specious persuasion.  We will use “fallacy” in the latter sense so 
that one may say a fallacy occurs where a discussion claims to conform to the rules of 
sound arguments but, in fact, fails to do so. 
10
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logic are simply descriptions of various arguments’ failures to adhere to 
one or more of these six logical rules.  
Arming oneself with an understanding of logical fallacy does not 
even require mastery of all six rules.  One common fallacy, the Fallacy 
of the Undistributed Middle, follows from the failure to observe just one 
of those six rules.  Knowledge of even one fallacy can be a significant 
asset to a lawyer.  The second32 of those six rules, the rule that requires 
that a syllogism “distribute” the middle term in at least one premise, 
must be observed in order to meet the test of validity.  When an 
argument fails to comply with this rule, the result is an argument that 
suffers from the Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle.  An explanation of 
what it means to “distribute” a term and which term is the “middle term” 
in any given syllogism will demonstrate how to spot this fallacy and 
why it is the hallmark of a formally invalid argument. 
III. THE FALLACY OF THE UNDISTRIBUTED MIDDLE AND ITS  
UNUSUAL NAME 
A lawyer can understand and explain this fallacy by understanding 
and explaining its name.  While logicians have endeavored to name this 
and other fallacies in ways that are descriptive,33 these descriptions use 
the terminology of formal logic.  Accordingly, neither the term 
“undistributed” nor the term “middle” will have immediate significant 
meaning to most lawyers or jurists.  However, both make sense with a 
little understanding of some of the terminology of formal logic.  
Understanding this terminology begins with understanding the structure 
logicians use to evaluate arguments.   
Evaluating an argument’s formal structure requires breaking an 
argument into components and assembling those components into a 
syllogism.34  Instead of using all of the precise words used in an 
 
Id. at 141 (quoting FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 4, at 3).  “A fallacious argument in logic is 
an incorrect argument.  It is also customary to restrict the word ‘fallacious’ to incorrect arguments 
which in certain contexts seem to some to be correct.”  Id. at 141 (quoting JAMES D. CARNEY & 
RICHARD K. SCHEER, FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGIC 11 (2d ed. 1974). 
 32. Those who reduce the number of rules to five, might refer to this as the first rule.  See, 
e.g., HURLEY, supra note 22, at 257. 
 33. Examples of some logical fallacies include “Affirming the Consequent,” “Denying the 
Antecedent,” “Illicit Process of the Major Term,” “Illicit Process of the Minor Term,” “Fallacy of 
Exclusive Premises,” and the “Existential Fallacy.”  COPI & COHEN, supra note 23, at 246-49, 300-
01. 
 34. “Now, to put an argument in syllogistic form is to strip it bare for logical inspection.  We 
can then see where its weak points must lie, if it has any, and consider whether there is reason to 
11
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argument, it is simpler to eliminate and paraphrase some of the words in 
the syllogism.  It may be possible to reduce some of those words to 
symbols.  Furthermore, it is sometimes appropriate to add implied words 
into the framework of the syllogism.  Ultimately, this process reduces 
the argument to a series of phrases or letters and symbols that stand for 
the facts in the argument and relationship between and among those 
facts.  However represented, the argument is arranged in the standard 
form of a syllogism. 
A syllogism is a deductive argument where the conclusion is 
inferred from two premises.35  This syllogism consists of two premises 
and a conclusion.36  Each premise consists of terms.  For example, one 
might argue, “All judges wear robes.”  This premise has two terms: 
“[persons who are] judges” and “persons who wear robes.”  In a valid 
categorical syllogism, there must be a common term that appears in each 
of the two premises.  Accordingly, we might continue the argument that 
begins with the premise “[a]ll judges wear robes” to add the premise 
“Chief Justice Roberts is a Judge.”37  The new premise, “Chief Justice 
Roberts is a Judge” has two terms: “Chief Justice Roberts” and 
“[persons who are] judges.”  The term that appears in both premises, but 
not the conclusion, is called the “middle term.”38  In this example, 
“[persons who are] judges” is the middle term because it appears in both 
premises but not the conclusion.  
 
believe that it is actually (i.e., materially) weak at those points.”  F. C. S. SCHILLER, FORMAL 
LOGIC:A SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEM 222 (1912). 
 35. COPI & COHEN, supra note 23, at 224. 
 36. Legal argument generally has three sources of major premises: a text (constitution, 
statute, regulation, ordinance, or contract), precedent (case law, etc.), and policy (i.e., 
consequences of the decision).  Often the major premise is self-evident and 
acknowledged by both sides.  The minor premise, meanwhile, is derived from the facts 
of the case.  There is much to be said for the proposition that ‘legal reasoning revolves 
mainly around the establishment of the minor premise.’ 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE:  THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 
42 (2008) (quoting O.C. JENSEN, THE NATURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 20 (1957)). 
Of course, some arguments are too complex to reduce to a simple syllogism.  Frequently, 
components of an argument are not essential to its truth or fallacy.  Similarly, portions of an 
argument are sometimes not expressed at all.  Such arguments are called enthymemes.  ALDISERT, 
supra note 19, at 61.  Conversely, sometimes a single syllogism is insufficient to fully embody all of 
the terms of an agreement.  In this situation a series of syllogisms can be linked together, with the 
conclusion of one syllogism forming the premise of a subsequent syllogism, to form a 
polysyllogism.  Id. at 64. 
 37. To be logically precise and consistent with the language used in this syllogism, the term 
“Chief Justice Roberts” would be stated “[persons who are] Chief Justice Roberts.”  Throughout this 
article, except where including the implied terms is helpful to follow the logical patterns, these more 
precise and consistent words will be omitted. 
 38. COPI & COHEN, supra note 23, at 225. 
12
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It is this “middle term” that is the focus of the Fallacy of the 
Undistributed Middle.  An understanding of the middle term is essential 
to understanding and explaining the fallacy.  As the name of the fallacy 
suggests, the problem with the middle term is that it is “undistributed.”  
This too is a term essential to understanding and explaining the fallacy.  
In logic, when a term is used in a way that “refers to all of the members 
of the class” referenced by that term, that term is said to be distributed.39  
Conversely, if a term only refers to a portion of the members of the 
class, it is “undistributed.”40  In the simplest case, a term modified with 
the word “all,” or some variant of the word “all,” would typically be 
distributed.  “All cars,” “every lawyer,” or “no judges” are all instances 
of the terms cars, lawyers, and judges being distributed.  Conversely, 
where the word “some,” or a variant of the word some, modifies a term, 
that term is undistributed.  “Some cars,” “many lawyers,” or “most 
judges” are instances of undistributed terms “cars,” “lawyers,” and 
“judges” respectively.  To illustrate this more completely, consider the 
following syllogism: 
All judges wear robes. 
Chief Justice Roberts is a judge. 
Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts wears a robe. 
In the example above, the term “judges” is distributed in the first 
premise, since it refers explicitly to “all judges.”  In the second premise, 
it does not suggest that Chief Justice Roberts constitutes the entire 
population of judges.  Instead, it indicates that he is a judge.  Since this 
is a reference to a portion of or example of the class of judges, “judges” 
is undistributed in this premise. 
As discussed above, the second law of deductive logic focuses on 
the middle term.  It is this middle term that must be distributed at least 
one time in at least one of the premises.  For example, if one states, “all 
 
 39. COPI & COHEN, supra note 23, at 225.  See also RICHARD WHATELY, ELEMENTS OF 
LOGIC 28 (1913) (“A term is said to be ‘distributed’ when it is taken universally, so as to stand for 
every thing it is capable of being applied to; and consequently ‘undistributed,’ when it stands for a 
portion only of the things signified by it . . . .”);  TINDALE, supra note 18, at 45 (“A term is said to 
be ‘distributed’ in a proposition when  it  is meant to refer to all members of the class of things that 
proposition denotes.”); JAMES A. WINANS & WILLIAM E. UTTERBACK, ARGUMENTATION 69 (1930) 
(“A term is said to be distributed if it refers to a class of things in its entirety.”); NICHOLAS BUNNIN 
& JIYUAN YU, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 188 ( 2004) (“A term is 
distributed if it refers to all members of the class to which it is referring and is explicitly or 
implicitly prefixed by a universal quantifier.”). 
 40. WHATELY, supra note 39 (“A term is said to be . . . ‘undistributed,’ when it stands for a 
portion only of the things signified by it . . . .”). 
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judges wear robes,” the term “[people who wear] robes”41 is 
undistributed since there are people other than judges who wear robes.”  
Similarly, if I were to state, “Muhammad Ali wears a robe,” the term 
robe is again undistributed because people other than the legendary 
boxer Muhammad Ali wear robes. 
Characterizing this term as undistributed becomes important when 
we look at these two premises together.  Consider the argument that is 
formed by assembling these two statements: 
All judges wear robes. 
Muhammad Ali wears a robe. 
Therefore, Muhammad Ali is a judge. 
The argument is fallacious because its middle term is undistributed 
in both premises.  While the conclusion is patently untrue, the structure 
of the argument is also logically flawed.  Try to explain what is wrong 
with this argument without discussing common knowledge or the rules 
of formal logic.  You might be able to explain why it is untrue without 
any training in formal logic by saying: “Everyone knows Muhammad 
Ali is not a judge.  He wore a boxer’s robe when he entered the boxing 
ring, but he never served as a judge or wore a judge’s robe.”  However, 
if you offered such common knowledge as your explanation, you would 
be missing the point.  You cannot explain what is wrong with this 
argument unless you understand something about formal logic.  That is 
because the logical form of this argument is faulty.  It is the ability to 
offer and explain this logical justification for the falsity of the 
conclusion that is so valuable to a lawyer.  This is particularly true when 
the conclusion is not as obvious as Muhammad Ali’s occupation. 
The reason this syllogism is logically flawed is that the term 
“robes” is undistributed in both the sentence “all judges wear robes” and 
the sentence “Muhammad Ali wears a robe.”  From here, we see the 
essence of this type of syllogistic argument and why it must be 
fallacious.  This syllogism reaches a conclusion by putting people in 
categories.42  That is why logicians call this form of argument a 
categorical syllogism.43  It is the relationship between the categories that 
 
 41. “People who wear” robes is implied by the sentence.  Theoretically, robes might be worn 
by mannequins, coat hangers, or other inanimate objects. 
 42. W. EDGAR MOORE, CREATIVE AND CRITICAL THINKING 194 (1967) (“a categorical 
proposition names or describes two classes and states a relationship between them.”).  
 43. More precisely, a categorical syllogism is made up of “categorical propositions.”  “A 
categorical proposition is made up of four components, the quantifier, the subject term, the copula, 
and the predicate term.  A quantifier is of one of two types: the universal quantifier ‘all’ or the 
particular (existential) quantifier ‘some.’  A term is a word that stands for a class of individuals, 
14
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justifies drawing a valid inference in the conclusion from the premises.  
The purpose of the middle term is to relate the subject and predicate 
terms of the syllogism together.44 
Because putting people in categories is the gist of the above 
argument, the rule of logic that requires that the middle term be 
distributed in at least one of the two premises ensures the integrity of the 
conclusion.  The middle term is the term that is common to both 
premises.  Accordingly, the conclusion, if valid, proves something as it 
relates to the middle term.  In order to ensure the integrity of such a 
conclusion, that middle term must, at least once, refer to all of the 
members of that categorical term.  If it does not, then the possibility 
exists that the middle term is actually referring to two distinct subsets of 
the middle term. 
This is where our example argument above goes wrong.  The 
middle term “persons who wear robes” is undistributed in the major 
premise.  Similarly, it is undistributed in the minor premise.  Judges and 
Muhammad Ali (and other boxers) are merely examples of the class of 
people who wear robes.  The fact that they are both examples of the 
category does not allow us to draw logical connections about judges or 
Muhammad Ali with respect to their propensity for robe wearing. 
Accordingly, when an argument is made in the form of a 
categorical syllogism, i.e., where the arguer is trying to draw a 
conclusion about two terms because of their membership in a similar 
class, lawyers should consider whether the middle term is adequately 
distributed in both premises.  If it is not, the argument commits the 
Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle, is logically invalid, and cannot 
ensure the truth of its purported conclusion. 
Changing the minor term, but leaving the middle term unchanged, 
does not improve the validity of the syllogism.  For example: 
All judges wear robes. 
Chief Justice Roberts wears a robe. 
Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts is a judge. 
 
called the ‘extension’ of that class.  For example, the term ‘stunt pilots’ stands for the class of stunt 
pilots.  A copula is a form of the verb ‘is’ or ‘are’ that joins one term to another.  The subject term 
stands for a class said to belong, or not to belong, to another class, denoted by the predicate term.  In 
the example . . . ‘Some accountants are daredevils’ is a categorical proposition, because it can be 
paraphrased as ‘Some accountants are individuals who are daredevils.’”  DOUGLAS WALTON, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CRITICAL ARGUMENTATION 54-55 (2006).  See also J. WELTON, A MANUAL OF 
LOGIC 156 (1904) (“A Categorical Proposition” is one which simply asserts or denies some fact; as 
‘Gold is yellow’; ‘True bravery is not rash.’”)   
 44. HURLEY, supra note 22, at 257. 
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While we know the conclusion to be true, its truth is not confirmed 
by the argument itself.  The middle term, “persons who wear robes,” is 
still undistributed in both the major and minor premises.  Accordingly, 
the syllogism still suffers from the Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle.45  
The only way to repair this logical defect is to ensure that the middle 
term is distributed at least once. 
We see arguments that take this form frequently in litigation.  Some 
case law examples of this type of argument are discussed below.  Then 
this article will consider this fallacy in more general and practical terms 
and consider some of the symptoms of arguments suffering from this 
fallacy. 
IV. COURTS HAVE RECOGNIZED THE FALLACY OF THE UNDISTRIBUTED 
MIDDLE AS A FORM OF FALLACIOUS REASONING AND REJECTED IT AS 
LOGICALLY INVALID AND UNRELIABLE 
The logical Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle is not just a 
theoretical tool of philosophy.  It is a practical tool that courts have used 
to analyze the validity of arguments.  Courts will be hard-pressed to 
accept an argument knowing that it rests on fallacious logic.  Here we 
will consider a few examples of judicial opinions that have employed the 
Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle, providing precedential support for 
the use of logical fallacy as a litigation tool, as well as practical 
examples of how the fallacy is manifested in arguments that might not 
seem  immediately to fit into the form of the syllogism. 
One example of a court using the logical Fallacy of the 
Undistributed Middle to decide a legal issue is seen in Grand Victoria 
Casino & Resort, LP v. Indiana Department of State.46  The case 
involved a state tax dispute.  Grand Victoria Casino & Resort claimed it 
 
 45. Note the difference here between whether the conclusion is true or false and whether the 
argument is logically valid or invalid.  Here we know the conclusion is true.  However, the form of 
this argument is not what leads us to that conclusion.  Just because an argument violates one of the 
rules of logic does not require that the conclusion is false.  Instead, it requires that the argument is 
invalid.  Conversely, while an argument may have a valid form, the validity of the form only 
guaranties the truth of the conclusion when the premises are both true.  “A valid argument can have 
true premises and a true conclusion, . . . false premises and a true conclusion, . . . or false premises 
and a false conclusion. . . . The only combination ruled out by very notion of validity is that of a 
valid inference with true premises and false conclusion, since a valid inference is one for which the 
logical forms of premises and conclusion guarantee that whenever the former are true, so is the 
latter.”  PAUL HOYNINGEN-HUENE , FORMAL LOGIC:  A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 14 (Alex 
Levine trans., 2004).  Of course, in the law, it is not enough to simply make conclusory statements.  
Instead, lawyers are required to prove their conclusions.  Herein lies the power of the fallacy as a 
tool for challenging legal conclusions. 
 46. 789 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003). 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/3
RICE 1.11.10.DOC 1/14/2010  12:18 PM 
2010] INDISPENSABLE LOGIC 95 
was exempt from state use tax on the purchase of a riverboat used as a 
riverboat casino.47  One of the issues in Grand Victoria Casino & Resort 
was whether the riverboat fit the definition of “motorboat” under the 
Indiana Code.48   
Indiana Code Section 9-31-3-1 states, “[E]very motorboat 
principally used on the waters of Indiana must be registered [with the 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles] and numbered.”49  The Indiana Department 
of state argued that because riverboats were watercraft, and motorboats 
were watercraft, then riverboats were motorboats required to register 
with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.50  The court rejected this argument 
as “fall[ing] prey to the fallacy of the undistributed middle.”51  The court 
summarized the department’s argument in its syllogistic form: “the 
Department argues that, (1) riverboats are watercraft, (2) motorboats are 
watercraft, therefore, (3) riverboats are motorboats and, thus, the 
registration requirements apply.”52 
The fallacy becomes clear when we more specifically identify the 
components of this syllogism.  The middle term is “watercraft.”  This 
term is found in the major premise and the minor premise, but not the 
conclusion.  Accordingly, the rule of logic requires that this middle term 
be distributed in at least one of these two premises.  In the major 
premise, “riverboats are watercraft,” the term “watercraft” is not 
distributed.  “Watercraft” as used in this premise is not universal.  It is 
not referring to all watercraft.  Some riverboats are watercraft, but not all 
watercraft are riverboats.  To the contrary, a riverboat is just one 
example, one subset of all of the watercraft.  
Similarly, in the minor premise, “motorboats are watercraft,” the 
term “watercraft” is not distributed.  Here, the term “watercraft,” as in 
the major premise, does not describe all watercraft.  Instead, it merely 
refers to another subset of the universe of all watercraft.  The court 
recognized this, stating: “the Department's argument falls prey to the 
fallacy of the undistributed middle.  ‘The nature of this fallacy becomes 
 
 47. Id. at 1043. 
 48. Id. at 1047. 
 49. Id. at 1048 (quoting IND. CODE § 9-31-3-1 (1998)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at n.10.  The Indiana Statute at issue imposed “use tax on the ‘storage, use, or 
consumption of a . . . watercraft’ if the watercraft ‘(1) is acquired in a transaction that is an isolated 
or occasional sale; and (2) is required to be titled, licensed, or registered by this state for use in 
Indiana.’”  Id. at 1047. 
 52. Id. at n.10. 
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more obvious in the following example: Cats are mammals. Dogs are 
mammals. Therefore, cats are dogs.’”53 
Like the watercraft case, Hoatson v. New York Archdiocese54 is 
another decision that employed the Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle 
to evaluate the parties’ arguments.  The plaintiff in Hoatson argued for 
recusal of the trial court judge.55  One basis for recusal articulated by the 
plaintiff was the trial court judge’s relationship with New York Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani.56  The plaintiff claimed that the trial judge had known 
Mayor Giuliani during his first term as Mayor of New York City.57  
Additionally, Plaintiff claimed that Mayor Giuliani knew an employee of 
the Defendant Archdiocese, Monsignor Alan Planca.58  Because both 
Mayor Giuliani and Monsignor Planca had a common acquaintance in 
the trial court judge, the plaintiff argued that the trial court judge should 
recuse himself.59 
The court held that the plaintiff’s argument suffered from the 
Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle.60  While the argument does not 
seem to fit neatly into a syllogism, a little analysis of the basic 
components of the plaintiff’s claim reveals the argument’s syllogistic 
form.  In essence, the plaintiff’s argument is this: 
The Judge is a friend of Mayor Giuliani. 
Monsignor Planca is a friend of Mayor Giuliani. 
Therefore, Monsignor Planca is a friend of the judge.61 
The middle term is the term that appears in both the major and 
minor premises: “friend[s] of Mayor Giuliani.”  Indeed, it is 
undistributed in both the major premise and the minor premise.  Neither 
the trial court judge nor Monsignor Planca encompassed the totality of 
Mayor Giuliani’s set of friends.  If Mayor Giuliani truly counted either 
of these men as a friend, either would be but a single representative of a 
 
 53. Id. at 1048 (quoting State v. Star Enter., 691 So. 2d 1221, 1229 n.8 (La. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 54. No. 05Civ.10467, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87877 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 55. Id. at *2 
 56. Id. at *3 
 57. The trial judge, the Honorable Paul A. Crotty, had served as corporation counsel to New 
York City during that time. United States Department of Justice, 
http://justice.gov/archive/olp/crottyresume.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
 58. The plaintiff was publicly critical of Monsignor Planca prior to this suit against the New 
York Archdiocese.  Hoatson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87887, at *28.   
 59. Id. at *12 
 60. Id. at *29. 
 61. Id. at *28. 
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larger set.  Accordingly, the court properly recognized the existence of 
fallacy in the logical structure of the argument.62 
While the argument is fallacious, this infirmity only demonstrates 
that the form of the argument is invalid.63  The fallacious nature of the 
argument does not require its negative, i.e., that Monsignor Planca was 
no friend of the trial court. 
The validity of a syllogism and the soundness of the argument's 
structure deal only with relations between the premises.  Validity deals 
only with form. It has absolutely nothing to do with content.  
Arguments, therefore, may be logically valid, yet absolutely nonsensical.  
Assuming valid form, the essence of argument must always be a search 
for the truth or falsity of the premises . . . .  Once this determination is 
made in constructing the premise in a deductive syllogism, however, we 
do not say that the conclusion probably will follow; the conclusion must 
follow.64 
However, if the plaintiff were to prove his intended conclusion, he 
would have to develop some other, logically valid, argument to do it. 
Graceland College Center for Professional Development and Life-
Long Learning, Inc. v. Kansas Department of Labor65 involved a labor 
dispute initiated by a former employee of the claimant Graceland 
College Center for Professional Development and Life-Long Learning, 
Inc.  The employee in that case worked for her employer for two years.66  
At the time she left her employment, she had accrued hourly wages, 
vacation time, and sick pay.67  She had also accrued prepaid 
commissions that the employer claimed she had not earned.68  The 
claimant’s employer offset the employee’s accrued hourly wages69 
against her prepaid commissions.70 
One issue in the case was whether these accrued hourly wages, 
vacation time, and sick pay constituted “wages” or “commissions.”71  
The claimant’s policy provided, “Programs that are not paid in full at the 
 
 62. Id. at *29. 
 63. See HOYNINGEN-HUENE, supra note 45. 
 64. ALDISERT, supra note 19, at 68-69. 
 65. Graceland Coll. Ctr. for Prof Dev. and Life-Long Lrng., Inc. v. Kan. Dep’t of Labor, 131 
P.3d 1281 (Table), 2006 WL 995733 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006).   
 66. Claimant worked for employer from May 21, 2001, through June 30, 2003.  Id. at *1. 
 67. Id. at *1. 
 68. Id. at *1. 
 69. While the court referred to “hourly wages,” the offset was made as to hourly wages, 
vacation time, and sick pay.  Id. at *1. 
 70. Id. at *1. 
 71. Id. at *4. 
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time of separation will be debited from your final commissions.”72  The 
claimant argued that the definition of the word “commissions” in this 
policy must be read in light of the Kansas statute that defines “wages” as 
“compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether 
the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other 
basis.”73  The court here concluded that the claimant’s argument suffered 
from an undistributed middle.74  The court described the fallacy in the 
claimant’s argument this way: 
Apparently, the logic is that, because the term “wages” includes hourly 
wages and commissions, then the term “commissions” must include 
hourly wages. If the argument were to be structured as a categorical 
syllogism, it would be stated as: hourly wages are wages; commissions 
are wages; therefore commissions are hourly wages.  The conclusion is 
deductively invalid for violating the fallacy of the undistributed 
middle, i.e., hourly wages and commissions are subsets of the general 
wages category but the subsets do not necessarily overlap. By analogy, 
a contract to purchase all of a neighbor's cows does not entitle the 
buyer to purchase the neighbor's horses, even though the statutory 
definition of “domestic animals” in K.S.A. 60-4001(b) includes, inter 
alia, both cows and horses.75 
The Court correctly considered the syllogism and identified the 
Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle76 in claimant’s argument: 
All hourly wages are wages; 
All commissions are wages; 
Therefore, all commissions are hourly wages. 
Once again, the middle term, “wages,” is undistributed in both 
premises.  Even if hourly wages and commissions together would 
encompass the entire class of “wages,” wages is still undistributed in 
both the major premise and the minor premise respectively.  
Accordingly, the argument is fallacious and must fail. 
Another case, Aylett v. Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development,77 involved the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development’s decision overturning the findings of an administrative 
law judge’s decision.  The Secretary’s designee (Katz) decided to find 
 
 72. Id. at *1. 
 73. Id. at *4. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Aylett v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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the claimant’s (Burris) testimony more credible than the son of the 
respondent (Memmott).78  Here, Judge Ruggaro J. Aldisert79 held that 
Katz committed an “egregious” error of logic.80 
Katz “credited the testimony of Ms. Burris, who had a profound 
personal financial stake in the outcome of this case, quantified at the 
final hearing to the tune of $100,000.”81  However, Katz also “corrected 
the ALJ for crediting Justin Memmott's testimony because, ‘as a 
Respondent, Mr. Memmott has a personal stake in the outcome of this 
litigation.82  He also has a personal and financial interest in exonerating 
his parents in this action.’”83  The court recognized, “The reviewing 
officer cannot have it both ways.  When it comes to finding credibility, 
he cannot fault Mr. Memmott, son of a respondent, for having a personal 
stake because of his relationship to his parents and ignore the personal 
stake of the intervenor, Ms. Burris.”84    
The court recognized that by “having it both ways,” Katz had 
“committed the formal fallacy of the undistributed middle.”85  The court 
went on to explain: 
The second of the six rules of the categorical syllogism provides that 
the middle term (the subject of the major premise and usually the 
predicate of the minor premise) must be distributed in at least one 
premise, that is to say, the term must be broad or general: if narrow or 
particular, it is called “undistributed.”  It is distributed only when the 
major and minor terms can be connected through or by means of the 
middle term, and for the two terms that become part of the conclusion 
to be reached (minor and major) to be connected through a third, at 
least one of the two must be related to the whole of the class 
designated by the third or middle term.86 
The court went on to put the argument in syllogistic form: 
 
 78. Id. at 1568. 
 79. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, sitting by designation.  Judge Aldisert has written several opinions discussing faulty logic in 
legal argument.  He is the author of two other works specifically addressing formal logic in legal 
reasoning, ALDISERT, supra note 6, in addition to several other books focusing on the judicial 
process. 
 80. Aylett, 54 F.3d at 1596.  (citing IRVING  M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 219 (7th ed. 
1986)). 
 81. Id. at 1568. 
 82. Id. at 1569. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
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“All persons who have a personal stake in litigation are not credible.” 
It is undistributed when it is said, “some persons who have a personal 
stake are not credible.” When an undistributed middle term is present, 
the conclusion cannot be justified: this is the fallacy of the 
undistributed middle.  With respect to this stated reason for rejecting 
the credibility of Memmott, the reviewing officer's reasons lack 
formal, valid or cogent logical support.87  
Katz’s reasoning suffers from an undistributed middle.  Judge 
Aldisert describes the syllogism of Katz’s reasoning this way: 
Some persons who have a personal stake in litigation are not credible. 
Mr. Memmott is a person who has a personal stake in this litigation. 
Therefore, Mr. Memmott is not credible.88 
The middle term is “persons who have a personal stake in 
litigation.”  The term is distributed in neither the major nor the minor 
premise.89  Judge Aldisert explained that changing the word “[s]ome” to 
“[a]ll” in the major premise would have a dramatic impact on the 
validity of the form of the argument.  “All persons who have a personal 
stake in litigation are not credible” would distribute the middle term 
“person who has a personal stake in litigation.90 
In Atlantic Aluminum & Metal Distributors,91 the Plaintiff 
was an importer of extruded aluminum tubes.  The issue in the case 
was whether the tubes fell within the definition of the words “rods” or 
“bars” as used in paragraph 397 of the 1930 Tariff Act.92  The United 
States claimed that the extruded aluminum tubes at issue were neither 
bars nor rods and therefore fell outside of the definition in this section.93  
Accordingly, the issue in the case was whether the hollow aluminum 
tubes constituted “bars” or “rods” or neither.94  In analyzing this issue, 
the plaintiff argued that the aluminum tubes were “hollow bars” and 
“hollow rods,” and, therefore, the tubes fell within the common meaning 
of “bars” and “rods.”95  In an attempt to bolster this argument, the 
 
 87. Id.   
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1560. 
 90. While the logical form of the syllogism would no longer suffer from an undistributed 
middle, the major term would be false.  While a witness with a personal stake in litigation may have 
their credibility scrutinized, their personal stake does not necessarily require that their testimony be 
incredible.   
 91. 47 C.C.P.A. 88, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1960) 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 90. 
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plaintiff relied upon various dictionary definitions of the words “bars” 
and “rods.”  Examples of the respective definitions included: 
The present record contains definitions from various lexicons 
introduced to show the common meaning of the terms “bars” and “rods.” 
bar  1. A piece of wood, metal or other material, long in proportion to 
its breadth and thickness, and having, in general, considerable rigidity, 
such as one used for a lever, support, hindrance, obstruction, fastening, 
etc. * * *3. A piece of some substance, of indefinite size, shaped so as 
to be long in proportion to its breadth and thickness; * * * 
rod  1. A straight or slender stick; a wand; hence, any slender bar, as of 
wood or metal.96 
The court held that the definitions established: 
that a bar or a rod is “long in proportion to its breadth and thickness.”  
The evidence establishes that the imported tubes are also “long in 
proportion to [their] breadth[s] and thickness[es].”  From these 
premises the importer asks us to find that tubes are bars and rods. This 
constitutes an invalid syllogism.97 
The court would put Plaintiff’s argument in the following 
syllogistic form: 
Aluminum tubes are objects that are long in proportion to their breadth 
and thickness. 
Bars and rods are objects that are long in proportion to their breadth 
and thickness. 
Therefore, aluminum tubes are bars and rods.98 
The court found that this argument’s middle term was 
undistributed: “The undistributed middle term prevents reliance upon the 
premises to support the importer’s conclusion.  If we were to agree with 
this argument, we would then be required logically to hold that every 
item having length would be a rod or bar because every item having 
length is, by definition, long in proportion to its breadth and 
thickness.”99  
 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
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V. RECOGNIZING THE FALLACY AND USING IT TO DEFEAT FALLACIOUS 
REASONING 
After considering these examples, a pattern emerges that 
demystifies the Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle as it commonly 
appears in legal argumentation.  The patterns help to take some of the 
work out of identifying the fallacy and explaining it to a court.  The 
fallacy, as it frequently manifests in legal argumentation, appears as the 
use of an example of a category to prove a conclusion that includes a 
term in the same category.  Consider these summaries of the cases 
discussed above.  First, in Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, LP v. 
Indiana Department of State,100 the following argument was made:   
Riverboats are watercraft; 
Motorboats are watercraft; 
Therefore, riverboats are motorboats.101 
The argument attempts to draw a conclusion that one term fits into 
a larger category, based on its relationship to a term that is an example 
of the same category.  Compare this pattern with Hoatson v. New York 
Archdiocese102: 
The Judge is a friend of Mayor Giuliani. 
Monsignor Planca is a friend of Mayor Giuliani. 
Therefore, Monsignor Planca is a friend of the judge. 
Again, the argument attempts to draw a conclusion based on two 
examples of friends of the Mayor.   
Again, in Atlantic Aluminum & Metal Distributors,103 we see 
this same pattern.  There the argument was that: 
Aluminum tubes are objects that are long in proportion to their breadth 
and thickness. 
Bars and rods are objects that are long in proportion to their breadth 
and thickness. 
Therefore, aluminum tubes are bars and rods.104 
The argument attempts to draw a conclusion based on two 
examples of the category “objects that are long in proposition to their 
breadth and thickness.”  In fact, if we return to each of the cases 
 
 100. 789 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. Tax. Ct. 2003). 
 101. Id. at 1048 n.10. 
 102. No. 05Civ.10467, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87877 (S.D.N.Y., Dec.1, 2006). 
 103. 47 C.C.P.A. 88 (Fed. Cir. 1960). 
 104. Id. 
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discussed above, we see this same hallmark of the Fallacy of the 
Undistributed Middle.  The arguer concludes that because one or both of 
the terms in the conclusion are examples of a class, there is some 
relationship between the two terms.  In Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, 
LP, examples of the types of watercraft were used to draw a conclusion 
about the relationship between riverboats and motorboats.105  In Hoatson 
v. New York Archdiocese, examples of types of friends of Mayor 
Giuliani were used to draw a conclusion about the relationship between 
Monsignor Planca and the Trial Judge.106  In Atlantic Aluminum & Metal 
Distributors, examples of objects that are long in proportion to their 
breadth were used to draw a conclusion between tubes and bars and 
rods.107  In each case, the parties crafted arguments using undistributed 
middle terms to attempt to draw logical conclusions.  In each case, those 
arguments were fallacious because they violated the second rule of 
deductive logic.  In each case, the court rejected the argument and their 
conclusions based on formal deductive logic.  These cases represent just 
a sampling of the decisions using the Fallacy of the Undistributed 
Middle to consider the logic of legal arguments.108  
At this broad level of abstraction, consider just how often litigators 
experience these types of arguments.  For example, litigated issues 
frequently focus on definitions.  Does a party, evidence, or conduct meet 
 
 105. 789 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003). 
 106. No. 05Civ.10467, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87877 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 107. 47 C.C.P.A. 88 (Fed. Cir. 1960). 
 108. See e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 578 (1967); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134 (1948); Allied Erecting & Dismantling, Co. v. USX Corp., 249 
F.3d 191, 202 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001); Aylett v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560, 1569 (10th 
Cir. 1995); Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1439 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 
493 U.S. 801 (1989); Regalado v. City of Chicago, No. 96C3634, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14902, at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1999); British Steel PLC v. United States, 20 C.I.T. 663, 673 n.11 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1996); Lucas Aerospace, LTD v. Unison Indus., L.P., 899 F.Supp. 1268, 1287 (D. Del. 1995); 
Foster v. McGrail, 844 F.Supp. 16, 21 (D. Mass. 1994); Pearson v. Bowen, 648 F.Supp. 782, 792 
n.26 (N.D. Ill. 1986); United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. 1515, 1525 (D. Mass. 1985); 
Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 595 F.Supp. 125, 131 n.4 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 779 F.2d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 1985); Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n., 527 F.Supp. 632, 636 
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Lakeland Constr. Co. v. Operative Plasterers Local No. 362, No. 79C3101, 1981 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11584, at *4 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1981); Glenn v. Mason, No. 
79Civ.3918(CES), 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13233, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Desilu Prods., Inc. v. 
Comm’r, T.C.M. 1965-307 (T.C. 1965); Batty v. Ariz. State Dental Bd., 112 P.2d 870, 873 (Ariz. 
1941); Nickolas F. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 222 n. 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); People v. 
Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 321 (Colo. 2003); Royer v. State, 389 So.2d 1007, 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1979); Barham v. Richard, 692 So.2d 1357, 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Star Enter., 691 
So.2d 1221, 1230 n.8 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Wein v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 498, 503 (N.Y. 1977); Hicks 
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a certain statutory or common law definition?  This question is 
frequently the fulcrum upon which the legal consequences pivot.  
Accordingly, the parties will search for arguments that support or defeat 
the claim that a party, conduct, or evidence fits within a certain 
definition.  
Arguments about definitions are frequently reduced to a battle of 
categorical syllogisms.  Sometimes the battle focuses on the factual basis 
for the truth or falsity of the major and minor premises.  However, 
sometimes the battle focuses on the logical basis for the relationship of 
the premises to the conclusion.  Particularly, where the parties do not or 
cannot argue the facts of the case,109 the logical structure of the 
categorical syllogism becomes the focus of the argument.    
Of course, even when the deductive logical structure is the essence 
of the argument, lawyers are famous for couching their arguments in 
conclusory language, describing them as deductively correct even when 
they are merely inductive.  The inductive arguments may very well offer 
persuasive insights suggesting the court draw a legal conclusion 
regarding the definitions at issue in the litigation, but they do not require 
that the court draw a certain conclusion in the way deductive arguments 
do.  The Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle helps identify the failings 
of the argument and exposes the argument for what is really is: at best an 
unpersuasive inductive argument and, at worst, a misleading fallacious 
attempt at deductive reasoning.  Furthermore, the fallacy then paves the 
way for either crafting a compelling deductive argument that logically 
requires the court reach a certain conclusion or crafting an inductive 
argument that can fairly compete with opposing counsel’s inductive 
argument. 
Similarly, the Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle has another, 
similar function, illustrated by the Aylett v. Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development case.110  Recall in Aylett, the court reduced the 
argument to this syllogism: 
Some persons who have a personal stake in litigation are not credible. 
Mr. Memmott is a person who has a personal stake in this litigation. 
Therefore, Mr. Memmott is not credible.111 
 
 109. For example, where the standard of review prohibits or restricts the parties’ ability to 
argue the truth or falsity of the premises, as in the case in a motion for summary judgment, the facts 
are construed in favor of the nonmoving party.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 250 n.5 (1986). 
 110. 54 F.3d 1560 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 111. Id. at 1569. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/3
RICE 1.11.10.DOC 1/14/2010  12:18 PM 
2010] INDISPENSABLE LOGIC 105 
Consider how you counter this argument in court.  I have observed 
lawyers responding to this kind of argument in many different ways, 
frequently reducing their response to, “Counsel can’t have it both ways 
your honor.”  Once a very experienced and talented trial counsel, 
confronted with a similar argument form, responded by relying on what 
he referred to as the “enduring legal maxim” of “what’s good for the 
goose is good for the gander.”  While that was an effective, practical 
description of the essence of what is wrong with these types of 
arguments, it does not describe the heart of the argumentative 
shortcoming of this argument.  Exposing the undistributed middle and 
explaining its legal significance in this argument provides a much more 
powerful, sophisticated, and compelling method of explaining this 
common problem in litigation. 
VI. A RETURN TO LOGIC 
Lawyers frequently overlook the importance of the logical structure 
of argument.  In fact, most are adept at distinguishing arguments that are 
logical from those that are illogical.  However, most lawyers are poorly 
armed for the difficult task of explaining and justifying why some 
arguments are logically valid and why others are not.  While busy 
practitioners have little time to study philosophy in between depositions, 
formal logic has provided them with a shortcut in the device of the 
logical fallacy, which can be an effective and efficient tool for analyzing 
the deductive validity of an argument and explaining what makes the 
argument invalid. 
Courts have used logical fallacies, including the Fallacy of the 
Undistributed Middle, to analyze and explain the validity of legal 
arguments.  These decisions confirm the philosophical validity of 
fallacies in legal analysis and provide a precedential basis for the use of 
logical fallacy as a jurisprudential tool.  While the Fallacy of the 
Undistributed Middle is just one of several formal fallacies, it is an 
important one that lawyers can use to distinguish faulty reasoning and 
ensure the logical integrity of legal argument. 
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